Philosophy's Critical Examination of Scientism: A Two-Part Analysis
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Chapter 1: The Limits of Scientism
In this two-part exploration, I present various philosophical critiques directed at scientism, drawn from my book, How We Are and How We Got Here: A Practical History of Western Philosophy. The shared objective of these philosophers is to temper the excessive confidence associated with scientism, advocating for a more open-minded and critical pursuit of knowledge.
Section 1.1: Alfred North Whitehead's Natural Theology
Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) was a key figure in the development of analytic philosophy, initially mentoring Bertrand Russell. However, he later distanced himself from analytic methods, favoring his own philosophical approach. He criticized how analytic philosophy and science often oversimplify reality into narrow frameworks. Inspired by his wife's profound appreciation for beauty and love, Whitehead recognized that there exists much more to explore beyond mere logic and scientific inquiry.
Whitehead's transformation from an analytic mathematician to a process philosopher is a remarkable academic journey. His philosophical themes echo those of Henri Bergson, yet there is no evidence of direct interaction between the two thinkers.
Subsection 1.1.1: Understanding Reality's Categories
Immanuel Kant's Copernican shift in philosophy established a new foundation for inquiry, acknowledging that the human mind actively structures experience. While Whitehead accepted Kant's categories, he criticized Kant for leaving open the possibility that human cognitive structures might not correspond to reality. Whitehead believed that the triumphs of science in uncovering truths about the world suggest that human conceptual frameworks must align with the structures inherent in reality. He posited that evolutionary theory supported this view, implying that human cognitive abilities should evolve in harmony with the nature of existence.
In a series of works starting with The Concept of Nature (1920), Whitehead articulated his process philosophy, proposing that reality should be perceived as a sequence of states in perpetual motion. His approach to knowledge acquisition involves beginning with a specific area of experience, then employing reasoning and imaginative thinking to generalize findings across other domains. He likened this method to a flight, beginning from the ground of experience, soaring into the realm of imaginative abstraction, and finally landing to make new observations informed by rational analysis.
Section 1.2: The Rejection of Reductionist Materialism
Whitehead challenged the prevalent metaphysical assumption that reality consists of independent fundamental units of matter. He argued against this reductionist perspective, advocating for a process-oriented view that prioritizes events over objects, emphasizing their interrelatedness. He identified four key assumptions of reductionist materialism: (1) particles maintain their identity over time, (2) each particle is self-contained and independent, (3) particles occupy specific locations in space and time, and (4) a particle's state at a given moment is determined solely by preceding events.
Recognizing the advancements in physics, particularly quantum theory, Whitehead noted that many contemporary physicists are beginning to question these reductionist assumptions. He was ahead of his time in applying concepts from quantum physics to broader areas of inquiry, linking the isolationist tendencies of classical physics to humanity's growing estrangement from the natural world.
Chapter 2: The Philosophical Landscape of the 20th Century
The first video, "Deconstructing The Myth Of Science - Part 2," delves into the intricate relationship between philosophy and the critique of scientism, presenting a nuanced examination of scientific claims and their implications for philosophical thought.
In his writings, Whitehead traced humanity's alienation from nature back to the mechanistic worldview that emerged in the 1600s. This philosophical bifurcation, which separated experiential knowledge from objective reality, led him to question whether scientific standards are overly restrictive. For Whitehead, the aesthetic experience—such as the red glow of a sunset—should be considered part of nature alongside the scientific explanations of phenomena.
Section 2.1: José Ortega y Gasset's Philosophy of Life
Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset (1883–1955) developed a philosophy of life that stands in stark contrast to scientism's reductionism. For a more in-depth look at Ortega's ideas, refer to my previous article on this subject.
Section 2.2: Jean-François Lyotard's Critique of Metanarratives
French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard (1924–1998) fiercely critiqued overarching theories and metanarratives. In The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1979), he asserted that society has outgrown the need for grand narratives, which are comprehensive theories explaining the nature of reality. Lyotard contended that individuals have lost faith in these narratives, leading to a fragmented society in search of new, localized stories.
With the advent of the computer age, Lyotard observed that technology has transformed the understanding of knowledge into mere information. This shift emphasized data acquisition over genuine human understanding, creating new hierarchies of knowledge based on computational analysis.
The second video, "A Defense of Classical Theology (Part 3): A Critique of Scientism and Naturalism," explores the philosophical implications of these critiques, illustrating how traditional theological perspectives can offer counterpoints to scientism.
In this context, knowledge is increasingly viewed as a commodity in a global competition for power, diverging from Francis Bacon's original assertion that knowledge is power. The compartmentalization of scientific disciplines has further exacerbated this issue, as each field increasingly operates within its own confines, failing to connect with broader societal narratives.
Chapter 3: Feminist Perspectives on Science
Feminist critiques of science began with a significant 1978 special issue of Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society. This collection of thirteen papers examined the gender biases entrenched in scientific inquiry, which historically relegated women to subordinate roles in scientific research.
Feminism challenges modern epistemology, critiquing the notion of a universal human nature that disregards the influences of gender, race, and sociohistorical contexts on knowledge acquisition. Third-wave feminists argue that perspectives are inherently tied to the knower's standpoint, suggesting that traditional epistemologies have marginalized women's experiences.
Feminist standpoint theory critiques science's reliance on objective rationality as the sole lens for understanding reality. This critique aligns with Whitehead's and Bergson's critiques of reductionism, emphasizing that the language used in scientific discourse shapes perceptions and research agendas.
Further Reading
Susan Haack is a prominent philosopher currently critiquing scientism. Access her free e-book, Scientism and its Discontents, for further insights. Additionally, Glenn Borchardt's The Ten Assumptions of Science provides a valuable examination of the necessary assumptions for scientific thought.
For a nuanced discussion of pragmatism's stance against scientism, refer to my previous writings. Articles like "The Nightmare of Scientism" and "The New Religion of Scientism" on Medium explore similar themes.
Ultimately, to grasp the complexity of truth, it is crucial to engage with diverse perspectives beyond the confines of any single ideological framework.