Understanding MITRE ATT&CK Framework for Supply Chain Attacks
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Chapter 1: Introduction to Supply Chain Compromises
As the frequency of supply chain attacks increases, these threats pose a notable risk to organizations. A thorough understanding of the behaviors, tactics, and techniques used by attackers is crucial for developing effective countermeasures. Attack frameworks provide valuable insights into these tactics and techniques, detailing how attackers interact with target systems to execute their assaults.
In a prior article discussing the history and evolution of software supply chain attacks, I highlighted various frameworks that address supply chain threats, including MITRE ATT&CK, CAPEC, ENISA, CNCF, and SLSA.
Section 1.1: Challenges with Multiple Frameworks
The diverse methodologies employed by different frameworks to categorize attacker tactics can create confusion for security professionals. This complexity may hinder their ability to relate specific attack techniques effectively, complicating the development of robust mitigation strategies. Moreover, as new compromises are identified and attacker techniques advance, the emergence of additional frameworks adds further layers of complexity.
To enhance my understanding of the attacker techniques outlined in these frameworks, I am conducting an in-depth analysis, beginning with the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
Subsection 1.1.1: Overview of the MITRE ATT&CK Framework
MITRE ATT&CK serves as a globally accessible repository of adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) grounded in real-world observations. In this framework, "Tactics" denote the reasoning behind an ATT&CK technique, while "Techniques" describe the methods by which an adversary achieves their tactical objectives.
Within the MITRE ATT&CK framework, supply chain compromises are categorized under the Initial Access phase and involve cyberattacks targeting software development and distribution processes. These attacks aim to inject malicious code or alter legitimate software components.
These compromises exploit vulnerabilities within the software supply chain, jeopardizing the integrity and security of software before it reaches end users. Successful supply chain attacks can have widespread repercussions, enabling attackers to disseminate compromised software across a broad spectrum of targets, thus impacting organizations and individuals on a global scale.
Section 1.2: Stages of Supply Chain Compromise
According to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, supply chain compromises can occur at various stages of the software development and distribution lifecycle, including:
- Manipulation of development tools
- Alteration of a development environment
- Tampering with source code repositories (both public and private)
- Modifying source code in open-source dependencies
- Interference with software update or distribution mechanisms
- Deployment of infected system images (such as factory-infected removable media)
- Substitution of legitimate software with modified versions
- Distribution of counterfeit products to legitimate distributors
- Interdiction of shipments
Chapter 2: Sub-techniques of Supply Chain Compromise
The MITRE ATT&CK framework further categorizes these compromises into three specific sub-techniques, each reflecting unique methods employed by adversaries:
- T1195.001 — Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools: This technique targets external third-party or open-source software dependencies, allowing adversaries to inject malicious code before distribution.
- T1195.002 — Compromise Software Supply Chain: Attackers may manipulate application source code or the software update process, or even replace compiled releases with altered versions.
- T1195.003 — Compromise Hardware Supply Chain: This involves manipulation of hardware components, such as servers and peripherals, before they reach the end user, potentially allowing attackers to embed backdoors that are challenging to detect.
Section 2.1: Limitations of the MITRE ATT&CK Framework
While the MITRE ATT&CK framework is extensive, offering a standardized approach to categorizing adversary tactics, it has certain limitations in its section on Supply Chain Compromise. These include:
- Limited Details: The framework provides a high-level overview that may overlook the complex nuances of supply chain attacks, making it difficult to understand specific attack vectors.
- Incomplete Coverage: The framework's techniques tend to be abstract, lacking comprehensive details regarding specific tools or processes that may be affected.
- Minimal Mitigation Guidance: While it offers basic detection and mitigation strategies, the advice tends to be generic, lacking depth regarding supply chain compromises.
- Focus on Tactics, Not Strategies: The emphasis on tactics and techniques may neglect the higher-level strategic understanding necessary for effective mitigation.
- Rapidly Evolving Landscape: As new attack vectors emerge, the framework may lag in capturing the latest developments in the field.
- Non-Technical Considerations: Important legal, contractual, and business aspects of supply chain compromises are not addressed within the framework.
Final Thoughts
Despite its limitations, the MITRE ATT&CK framework lays a solid foundation for comprehending and addressing supply chain threats. Organizations can bolster their defenses by integrating the MITRE ATT&CK framework with current threat intelligence, real-world case studies, and specialized knowledge.
Recognizing the gaps within the MITRE ATT&CK framework, the industry has introduced a new framework called the Open Software Supply Chain Attack Reference (OSC&R), launched in February 2023. I plan to conduct a thorough review of this framework and others in upcoming articles, so stay tuned!
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